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MCtttVA.CO?'iSummary: This paper considers the factors that affect out-
put per manhour during peace and war. The forces oper-
ating during peacetime have resulted in a trend in labor
productivity that rises rather steadily and is marred by few
lapses in progress. During wartime, however, enormous
changes occur in the characterofoutput, in the corn posi-
tion of the labor force, in the conditionsofworking and
living, and in the haste with which things are done. Power-
ful forces thu. arise which make for decline in the average
productivity of labor. In the War of1914.18,the evidence
indicates, such a decline in labor productivity occurred, it
is likely that history will repeat itself during the present
conflict. But this is not certain. Whether output per man-
hour will decline and at what rate depends, in fact, on
the steps that are taken to avert such a decline. And this, in
turn, will depend on how well we come to understand the
intricate problems of expanding output, and how we




As A NATiON turns from the pursuits of peace to the wag-
ing of war, its aggregate output of goods and services is
altered and their character modified. One factor account-
ing for change in the size and composition of output is
change in labor productivity. The difference between war-
time and peacetime characteristics of labor productivity
may best be understood if we first examine all the factors
affecting production.
To begin with, the nation's output will be expanded if
the proportion of the population engaged in economically
productive effort is increased by finding jobs for all mem-
bers of the usual labor force and by drafting into the
sphere of production persons not usually gainfully occu-
pied - retired workers, women, students, idlers. Second,
hours of labor may be stretched; the working day itself
may be lengthened, and Saturdays, holidays, even Sundays
may cease to be days of relaxation. These two steps lead in
the direction of more workers and longer work periods.
Output may be augmented also by a rise in labor's produc-
tivity, that is, by an increase in the amount each man pro-
duces each hour he works. Indeed, if labor productivity
should fall despite efforts to maintain or increase it, added
manhours of work will be more or less offset, and the na-
tional product may expand less than is expected, or even
decline.
So much for the total national product, which consists
not only of goods ready for use in peace or war consump-
tion but also of capital goods. In addition to the three ways
mentioned, the production of commodities and services
for the waging of war and the satisfaction of immediate
human needs in wartime may be expanded by diversion of
effort ordinarily devoted to augmenting the capital stock
of the country. Even the effort required merely to maintain
the nation's capital resources, including household capital,
may be shunted to the production of civilian and war
3
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goods. As the manufacture of durable civiliangoods is pro-
hibited, consumers will haveto make their stocks last
longer, buy at thrift shops.or go without. The bride who
would like brand new furnituremay have to content her-
self with second bandpieces and will not be able toset up
housekeeping in a new house;nor will a shiny newauto-
mobile be among her wedding gifts.Expenditure of time,
energy, and money on education and trainingmay be de-
ferred. Similarly, the stock ofcapital goods held bybusi-
ness concerns may be drawn upon toswell the supply of
goods ready for finaluse. Inventories, equipment, intang-
ible resources (tradeconnections, patents, andcopyrights)
may be under-maintained and theresources thus freed
turned to other uses. Diversion ofthis sort mayoccur with-
out necessarily diminishing productivecapacity immedi-
ately, though sooneror later the effect on capacitymust
be adverse.1
The number of units ofcommodities and services ready
for use may be multipliedfurther by deliberateadultera- tion. Less durableor less decorative clothes willsatisfy
certain needs as wellor nearly as well as better clothes,and will cost less.
The output of goods andservices especially usefulin
war may be expanded not aloneby the above methodsbut also, of course, bycurtailing the quantity ofperishable or
semidurable civilian goodsand services produced.Cloth- ing may be rationed,and even theconsumption of food and fuel cut down.
Although change in laborproductivity is the theme of
this paper,we must consider the otherfactors affecting the
nation's output, for thevarious changesare not unrelated
to labor productivity. Beyondcertain limits, for example,
we cannot add to theworking force withoutinterfering with the formationof intangible humancapital and there- by with the efficiencyof labor:young men taken out of school and putto hard workcannot be expected to learn
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as much as they would otherwise, and cannot l)c expected
to be as useful as better trained persons. Nor can men work
excessively long stretches: at some point output per man-
hour begins to fall. And as the work week is lengthened.
more of civilian goods, such as food, is consumed and the
cost of maintaining capital equipment rises. Conversely, if
we cut civilian consumption of rood, shelter, and transpor-
tation too much we undermine labor productivity: labor
efficiency is sapped when workers live in uncomfortable,
inconveniently located houses, and, after ridingon crowded
busses and Street cars, are already tired when they arrive
at their jobs.
Because of this interdependence there are economic as
well as absolute limits beyond which it would be unwise to
push any one of the several methods of expanding the
national product. For the same reason, no really definitive
statement can be made about the future development of
any one of the variables since we do not know exactly what
is going to happen to the others. Indeed, our knowledge of
the relations/ups among the variables is far from exact;
moreover, it is likely that the relationships themselves are
variable. But while we cannot be exact in our COilCIUSiOUS,
we need not confine ourselves to a purely historical, descrip-
tive statement of labor productivity in peace and in war.
Te do know a little about how the variables other than
labor productivity will behave, or at least their range of
values, and we can make some plausible guesses about a
few properties of the interrelationships between them afl(l
labor productivity.
COMMENSURABILITY OF WARTIME AND PEACETIME PROD('CTS
\\Then we attempt to compare productivity inwar and in
peace we soon realize that we are faced with the task of
corn paring national products produced under radically
different conditions. Because the whole scheme of values
basic to the determination of the national product is quite
5
.different in war and in peacetime. there is a fundamental
ambiguity in the statistical measures of labor productivity.
Note lutist be taken of this before we begin our recital of
changes in output per manhour.
Readers who have threaded their way through discus.
sbus of concepts of national income, as in the earlysections
of Simon Kuznets' treatise, National Income and Its Corn-
posit ion,2 are aware of the difficulties of defining andmeas-
uring the national product. These difficultiesare challeng-
ing when one is dealing with a reasonably stable peacetime
economy; they become exasperating when the task is to
compare war and peace economies. I could go through the
whole list of controversial points (Dr. Kuznets devotes
some fifty pages to them) and show how the no-man's land
bordering each widens vastly whenwe compare peace pro.
duction with war. But all that is possibleol- desirable here
is a brief review.
In time of war the kind and relative importanceof non-
market goods shift considerably. We spend lesstime amus-
ing ourselves and more time actingas air wardens, selling
government savings bonds, collecting scrap. or workingas
dollar-a-year men; some war production is thusprovided
at the expense of civilian production withoutpassing
through the war budget. As housewives becometaxi-drivers
and factory workers, the calculatednational product may
rise more rapidly than the nationalproduct inclusive of
housewives' services. Thecommon procedure of ignoring
most non-market goods in the calculation ofthe national
product may be relatively innocuous inpeacetime. It leads
to trouble when economic and social lifechanges radically,
and especially whenwar descends upon a country.
Moreover, the unit of valuationis fundamemallyaltered.
Price fixing during wartime,the provision of free goods
such as gas masks,government supply contracts based on
cost-plus rather than the usualmarket mechanisms, the
granting of subsidies ratherthan higher prices for scarce
6
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Smaterialsthese lead to a system of prices quite different
than that existing in peace. Which system of prices is most
suitable for rendering commensurate the immense pile of
heterogeneous goods that comprise the national product?
How to select the base prices with which to compute the
index o real national output, or analogously, how to de-
flate the current values in which national income is meas-
ured, becomes an acute issue. Prices at any one time are
never quite appropriate to evaluate output at some other
time. When war transforms the value system, the always
more or less illogical device of index numbers touches
even the tough sensibilities of the statistician. Peace prices
are no more applicable to war production than war prices
to peace production; a cross or combination of the two is
not wholiy applicable to either.
The computation of imputed rents on durable goods
also becomes hazardous when we compare national output
in peace and in war. On some types of durable consumer
goods rents are seldom computed. When those on which
rents are calculated gain in relative importance. as housing
does during wartime because it is needed in new war in-
dustry centei-s and because it. is more durable than most
other consumer goods, incomparabilities arise in the meas-
urement of national products at two points in time. In
addition, the imputed rental rates become incomparable
because of under-maintenance and price fixing. Whether
to impute rent on government-owned property becomes
another serious issue, for such property, especially that
devoted to war, expands enormously in volume.
The difficulties of measuring capital consumption, ap-
parent even in peacetime, grow more troublesome with
the advent of war. Puzzles in calculating depreciation and
obsolescence, which ordinarily may be ignored, become
too insistent to be easily disposed of. Besides the tangles
caused by intensive use of some types of equipment and
under-use of others, and by variation in the rate of obso-
7lescence, a serious difficulty results from the (Irastic change
in the implicit rate of discount basic to all computations of
capital and capital consumption. The value of future goods
of many kinds drops far below that of present goods. An
airplane or machine tool five years in the future (oreven,
sometimes, five weeks) may be worthas little compared
with an airplane or machine tool todayas the proverbial
winter ice in comparison with ice when thetemperature is
in the 90's. The treatment of capital gains afl(llosses also
becomes complicated.
Government services are no less difficult to evaluatethan
rent on government-owned capital goods. Shallwe value
soldiers' and sailors' labor at their cash pay?Are these and
other government services to be consideredfinished or un-
finished? That is, are they to be considereda part of the
national product or merelyan expense incurred in its
creation? I assume that allwar commodities ready for use
against the enemy andwar services actually so used are
final goods, and thereforepart of the national product.3
To treat them otherwise wouldleave little point to the
question what happens to laborproductivity during the
transition from peace to war; for, whenguns are produced
at the expense of butter, theoutput of peace goods alone
definitely declines in relationto manhours applied to all
production.
Obviously, not muchcan be done to dispose of these
difficulties satisfactorily. However,the differences between
the factors that affect laborproductivity in war and in
peace suggested by the foregoing reviewcannot be dis-
regarded. We now know alsothat while we must note what
the statisticscan teach us, too much reliancecannot be
placed upon estimates ofthe aggregate product of theecon-
omy, no matter how good the basicstatistical data or how
carefully compiled. Conceptualdifficulties will infectour
statistics. For thisreason, and also because estimates of the
national productare not thoroughly consistent inconcep-
8tual structure or degree of accuracy,4 I shall refer also to
estimates of labor productivity in the several branches of
industry for which they have been computed in the studies
of production and productivity made at the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research.5 These, though they do not
cover all industry, are conceptually less ambiguous for our
purpose, and statistically more reliable than most estimates
based on national income.
I shall not, however, confine discussion to the statistics.
We are really interested in the factors affecting productivity
and production, for unless we know them we can reason
only crudely by analogy or extrapolation. Such reasoning
is dangerous because conditions change; alternatives are
always open, and those selected now may be different from
those chosen in the past. My main objective, thereforeis
to understand factors and to state hypotheses concerning
changes in labor productivity in peace and war.
PRODUCTIVITY IN PEACE
That the national product per employed worker has risen
over the years can be read in the records of all nations
fortunate enough to possess them. In the United States it
rose from about $1,400 in 1899 to about $1,850 ill 1937,
the cyclical peak year preceding the war boom, or some 30
to5 per cent.6 (Thesevalues per worker are both ex-
pressed in 1929 prices.) Per manhour, of course, the rise
has been greater. If hours were cut as much as one-fourth,
on the average, and this does not seem unlikely,7 total out-
put per manhour actually worked must have gone up about
75 or 8o per cent.
The records are not thoroughly consistent in respect of
the exact increment in total output per manhour. I we
look at the more reliable series for certain branches o
industry, we find still more striking changes. For manufac-
turing, output per manhour tripled during the first four




increment less than for the entireeconomy: in this divjsjo
steam railroads, over 185 per cent between 1899and 1gj;
1902 and 1937.For agriculture alone is thepercentage
even greater, 270 per cent between1902 and 1939for
for electric light andpower. about ,joo per cent between
output per manhour rosesome 65 per cent between 1899
and
It is rather surprising that allexcept one of tile percent-
ages cited indicate higher annual rates of increasethan that
for the economy at large.Though exact knowledge is lack-
ing, several explanationscan be offered for this apparent
inconsistency.8 And this much iscertain: within anyreason-
able margins oferror that we may assume, we finda sub-
stantial increase in theaverage product per manhour. If
we could take into account improvementsin the quality of
goods and services during thelast four decades, the rise
would seem evenmore substantial.
To understand the growthof labor productivity during
$
peace we must note two salient andrelated characteristics
of a developingeconomy. First, changes in technology(as
well as in the numberof workers, capital,economic organi-
zation, and character ofdemand) are ordinarilyslow. A
stimulus arising inone part of the economicsystem is
transmitted to other parts beforethe system has fallen far
out of gear. Needsare matched by sources of satisfaction
before they havegotten out of hand, andnew means of
production, if really useful,eventually succeed in creating
demands for their services.Second--and this is precisely
because of the gradualness,spread, and interrelationshipof
peacetime economic changestheadvance in nationalout-
put per manhour is theresult of a process affectingall industries, thoughsome more than others. Thebonds
among them are so many andso strong that change inone segment of industrymust in time affect othersegments. Increase in laborproductivity can ofcourse be ap-
proached in terms ofdevelopments within individualin-dustries. We can take it to be the sum of changes in the
various segments of the economy and turn to each industry
for an explanation of the change in it. Evidence of growth
in the capital stock, improvements in equipment and in
methods of arranging production, trends toward standard-
ization, progress in labor management, could readily be
accumulated. But it would not be long before the investi-
gator came to realize that he could not fully understand
or explain the changes in any single industry when viewed
in isolation. For example, changes in the kind and quality
of raw and semi-processed materials have seldom occurred
at a rate so rapid that users could not make the requisite
adjustments. And gains in the labor productivity of in-
dustries consuming materials often reflect changes in the
industries producing these materials. Advances from time
to time in the processing of steel sheets in steel plants have
enabled the large number of industries using ferrous ma-
terials to modify their processes and products in such a way
as to lessen the work to be done by thempet' umt of
product. Similarly, industries supplying equipment have
helped raise the productivity of other industries. The fac-
tory-made tractor gradually set free the farm labor formerly
needed to care for draught animals. The railroad industry
benefited from the trend toward lighter and stronger
height cars and locomotives, and higher powered fuels.
Year in, year out, such forms of non-manufacturing en-
deavor as engineering and independent research have made
their contribution to manufacturing. Ideas concerning or-
ganization and management have not remained secrets of
the industries that originated them. Though they spring
up in different areas of our industry as well as abroad,
they gradually flow into a common pooi. drawn upon and,
after experimentation, adapted to the special needs of all
types of enterprise.
The spread of the railroad system led to the develop-
ment and intensive exploration of the regions opened Lip,
11enabling us to tap new sources ofraw materials, animal,
vegetable, and mineral. The highly concentrated localiza-
tion ol lactory industries, with the fine division of labor
an(l other advantages it implies,was accompanied by the
(levelopment of cheap and efficienttransportation both
from source 0supply to factory and among Specialist
plants. Advances in water transportation andin other in-
dustries facilitating foreign trade have (lonemuch to bring
materials and machines toour industries arid open up mar-
kets for their products, fostering thegrowth of world-wide
trade. The expanding scaleon which production is carried
on, if it proceeds at a deliberatepace (as it (IOCS during
peacetime), in itself makes for greater productivity.
Not only are the means of advancementin labor pro(Iuc-
tivity more or less shared, but imlustries'incentives to
search out and utilize thesemeans ai-e mutually stimulated.
The discovery and application ofadvanced techniques and
subsequent growth in new industriesexerts pressure on the
older ones thatare relatively stable or quiescent. The latter
attempt to cut costs in order tostein the tide of rising
competition. Though seldom successfulin the effort to
retain their old position, they domanage to become some-
what more efficient. Outputper manhour thus advances in
mature and decadent industries along withthose in indtms-
tries young and growing.
I have already cited the figuresforseveralmajor branches
of industry. Referencemay be made also to minor branches
of mining and manufacturing.Remarkably enough, in
practically none, noteven in mining, has outputper man-
hour failed to showa net rise during the last threeor four
decades. Even the twoapparent exceptions to the general
trend in manufacturing,locomotive construction and ship-
building, are to be explainedin terms of huge quality
changes, or of changes in thedegree to which the fabrica-
tion of the final product iscarried on in the industry where
it is assembled.
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SIn peaceume, therefore, gain in productivity is part of
an organic process of growth. And in this process thc rate
is seldom sufficient to create unbalance. Growth may be
very rapid indeed in some industries, of course. Automo-
bile output vcnt up between 1899 and 1914 many thou-
sand per cent, and between 1919 and 1937 rayon produc-
tion mounted one hundredfold. But because these high
rates were not general, labor, materials, capital, and capital
equipment could be obtained fairly readily by the expand-
ing industries and transport facilities were not choked.
I have minimized the presence of haste and unbalance
in the peacetime development of the economy. Often, how-
ever, even in peace there is a haste that leads to disequi-
librium, as the records of business cycles indicate. During
the upturn in business, as expansion leads into prosperity,
forces are set in motion that make for declines in labor
productivity. Professor Mitchell has stressed those related
to the bringing into production of less efficient workers,
machines, and establishments as output grows; the waste
and inefficiency when output is large, labor is scarce, and
hours are long; and the delays in getdng materials and
making shipments. Usually outweighing these forces, how-
ever, are increases in quantity and improvements in quality
of capital equipment, advance in other aspects of tech-
nology, big orders making possible longer runs on a par-
ticular machine set-up, and elimination of the dis-econ-
oxides that some industries suffer when they operate at low
percentages of capacity. Before the system has expanded
beyond the point where the net balance between these sets
of forces is negative, recession seems to set in. Economic
factors, functioning through tile encroachment of costs on
gross income 'and the subsequent fall in profits, prevent
too much unbalance in a free enterprise system. During
recession the factors that make for greater productivity
when business is rising work less intensively or even in the
opposite direction. Advances in quantity and quality of
13capital equipmentare retarded or cease, while low utiliza-
tion of capacity reducesthe efficiency ofsome industries in
terms of manhoursper unit of product. But it is during
recession too that the factors thataffect labor productivity
adversely in times ofexpansion now favor it.Inefficient
production factorsare taken out of operation, andwaste
is eliminated. It isprecisely during recession anddepres- sion that businessmen have the opportunity to plugup
sources of waste and seek othermeans of enhancing econ-
omy of operation_means thatoften becomepermanent
Soul-cec of savings in labor andother factors. Asa result, output per manhourseems to go forward ata more or
less steadypace during both prosperity anddepression, at least in terms ofannual periods.9 Nationalincome per
person engaged (expressed in1929 prices), the oneover-
all measure oflabor productivity, availablein reasonably
accurate formonly for 1919-38, showsno response to the
recessions of 1920-21,1923-24, and I92627.10 Theappreci-
able decline from1929 to 1932 may reflectno more than tile drop in hourso labor that occurred betweenthese two
years. The short termfluctuations in most of theNational Bureau seriesOft manufacturing and miningproductivity
are mild and seem to beunrelated to cycles ingeneral busi-
ness. The same is true of thelabor productivity indexfor railroads, whichseems to have respondedto the recession
of 192912 alone,and weakly at that.
In peacenne thechanges that requireadaptation on the part of businessmen, workers, andConsumers occur within the limits ofa fairly stable set ofinstitutions. We donot have to think howto behave every timesomeone gives us an order for merchandise.We act in accordancewith habits
acquired through decadesof training.Schumpeter's graphic picture of the profoundrole of habit andexperience in the circular flow ofeconomic life applies alsoto ordinary
economic development.We are supported byour invest-
ment in intangible capitalas well as by our labor. Carrying
14us along through the relatively quiet course ofeconomic
activity without excessive strain on our powers of adapta-
tion, our intangible capital bccomes obsolete only by de-
grees, not so rapidly that we cannot maintain it by mod-
erate effort.
PRODUcTIVITY iN WAR
Contrast this situation with that of wartime, when we are
a "nation learning new trades".1' Not only are thereformi-
dable changes in output; even its composition is trans-
formed. Into the process of turning from one product to
another goes much of our energy. As Dr. Mitchell pointed
out in igi8: "Had war production consisted of supplies
like those turned out in igi, the volume might have
grown much faster." The altered character of products is
not the only innovation when war comes. Fundamental
changes occur also in materials, in the organization and
control of industry, in marketing, transportation and
niethods of finance. And there is little time for adaptation.
Everything is hurried. Speed rather than cost is the cri-
terion of efficiency. As noted earlier, the rate of time dis-
count is very high. In the shift from peace to war produc-
tion time is so pressing that it is often more economical to
throw some workers into idleness, temporarily or even for
the duration, than to move slowly through a smoother
transition to what might eventually have been a higher
level of war production. Bottlenecks are evaluated pri-
marily in terms of time rather than cost; in peace, the
reverse is true. Normal schemes of valuation no longer
apply when the fate of the nation is at stake. Even in a
long war, stability and balance seem always out of reach.'
This is perhaps the basic factor tending to reduce pro-
ductivity during wartime, and one that sometimes begins
to exert its influence even before the actual outbreak of
hostilities. In addition, of course, there are related specific
factors that operate, on a modest scale, even in peacetime.
15But they operate with decpcucdintensity as the war pro-
glesses. The influx of untrainedor inexperienced workers
dilutes labor skill.If unemployed for some time,even
experienced older workers become relativelyinefficient
and require sonic retraining.Again, sonic trained workers
needed in the essentialwar industries are permitted to
enlist or are indiscriminately(lrafte(l into the army, despite
what was learned in the1gii-i8 war. Excessive overtime,
unaccustomed surroundings, inadequate food- in some
countries, at least- eventually lead to fatigue, illness, and
labor inefficiency.Experience with trying to get the last
ounce out of workers, both in thiscountry and in Britain
during the first \VorldWar, suggests that thereare eco-
nomic limits on the length ofthe work day.13 If these limits
are exceeded, increases in hoursare more than offset by
declines in outputper manhour; indeed, output per worker
begins to declineeven before these limits are reached. The
strains of wartime workare aggravate(l because the worker
must learn to deal with unhimjljarmaterials, different
specifications, special maclimes,and often strangesuper-
visors. Wage ratesmust be set on labor applied tonew
machines and products, and thisprocess, always a delicate
one, may lead to friction and grievance,especially when
everyone is under war pressure.11
High cost mines and plantsare brought into produc-
tion. Mitch has alreadybeen made of the situationin
the copper industry, andone reads today of the reopening
of iron mines that hadnot been operating since 1918. Re-
versing a trend begun inthe 1890's, beehive cokeovens
are built, despite theirwaste of byproducts.
Bottlenecks and breakdowns intransportation lead to
delays in supplies andmaterials, and in fact, inconveni-
ences all along the line. Sinkings incoastwise trade and on
the high seas and long waitsfor convoy are expensive.Nor
should we forgetdamage to industrial andconsumer prop-
erty done by the enemy.
i6Sonic emphasis may be placed on the difficulties of ob-
taining materials, especiallythose formerly imported.
Efforts to save scarce materials and cut waste are costly.
Ersatz materials not only yield inferior products, as a rule,
but are expensive to produce. When the law of conipara-
tive advantages in international trade is'violated', the
penalty is declining output per unit of labor effort.
These adverse factors affect all industries, though in dif-
ferent degree. Industries producing consumer goods re-
quiring materials needed for war are disturbed by priori-
ties and rationing, and their under-utilization of capacity
is sometimes accompanied by a decline in labor produc-
tivity. These and other consumer goods industries (even
those not affected by scarcities of materials) are disrupted
also by a dwindling labor supply, lack of equipment, and
many transportation difficulties.'5 Industriesproducing
basic materials (steel and copper, for example) must cx
pand rapidly, even modify the character of their out':. in
some degree. Industries engaged directlyin the production
of war materials are virtually transforr.ied. with all the
pains of birth and adolescence entaikd.
So much for the factors making for declines in output
per manhour. There are, of course, certaincounteracting
forces. When new plants have to be constructed, they may
be plants using the latest equipment. But they are not nec-
essarily optimum in respect of lal)or: other factors are
speed. availability of materials, and shoddiness of construc-
Lion in anticipation of a short war. Nor are theynecessarily
optimum in relation to peacetime standards. Warplants
are, or should be, built with an eyetoward protection from
attack: they should not be too close together; they may
have to be built away horn the coast, which may mean
away from transport facilities, sourcesof supply, labor mar-
kets, and delivery points; and their structureshould pro-
vide for blackouts and similar wartime exigencies.Aside
from the qualifications attaching to the efficiencyof spe-
17S
cially built warp1ants, we mustremember that plantscon- verted from peacetimeuse (and these must inevitablycon- stitute a preponderantproportion of all wartimefactories) are by that very fact belowthe standard ofa specially con-
structed plant. As fornew plants, there isa risk, because of
inexperience, that whatlooks optimumon the blue-print may not turn outto be so; yet thepressure of time pre- cludes much advanceplanning andexperimentation
The transition frompeace to war productionmay mean a shift from industriesthat have alreadymade the most of their opportunitiesto industries still in thestage of increas- ing return, in thedynamic sense. Currentmanagement and engineeringliterature abounds instriking instances of
technological developmentsin the war industriesas custom production methodsare supplanted bymass production.'n
However, there is doubtthat the shift frommature to
young industries vill in factcontribute to greater national
output per manhour. Atransfer of resources fromthe tech-
nologically well advancedautomobile industry, forex- ample, with its movingbelts, labor subdivisionand special tools, to the relativelybackward airplane industry,with its
hand-assembly and intensiveuse of skilled labor,may in- deed meana new burst of advance inlabor productivity.
Airplane manufacturers,faced with thedemand that they
spawn airplanes, may beginto introduce all the devices
and arrangementsalready so welldeveloped in thepeace- time massproduction industries. Butthis upward trend in
airplane manufacturemay be from a level ofproductivity lower than the levelof automobile andother peacetime
manufacture, and willno more than retrieve theinitial loss following thetransfer ofresources. The breakneck speed
may prevent even theproductivity level of thepeace mass
production industriesfrom being reached.'However, too close an analysisis not warranted,for soon weare caught in the old dilemmaincommenstlrability ofoutput in peace and in war.
i8
C.Also contributing to labor efficiency is popular enthusi-
asm for the war effort;labor troubles are fewer. The pool-
ing of ideas, blue-prints, patents, and equipment.and
drives toward standardization likewise help productivity.
The shift of workers from submarginal farms, automo-
bile service stations, and shops to industry (a shift possible
in peacetime but proceeding slowly, if at all) may lead to
a more intensive useof low cost enterprises in these fields
of activity. Houswives may move from the inefficient
kitchen to the efficient factory. In general, war may bring
a reshuffling of jobs and workers toattain the maximum
utilization of talent and training, not only in terms of the
new situation but even in terms of the old.Whether this
will in fact occur depends, for example, on the pliability
of labor union policy as well as on how carefully we plan
and how earnestly we try to carry out our plans (and this
in turn depends on the other urgent demands on our crea-
tive and administrative resources). Then there is another
possibility: the transformation of the character of output
during war may bring with it a shift of workers to indus-
tries that yield larger output per worker than those from
which the workers came, a shift that would of itself tend to
augment output per worker. Although merely aconjecture
based upon little information, this result could come about
without added investment if equipment in the relatively
growing industries could be used more intemisively.18
It is hazardous to guess what the net result of the inter-
play of these various factors may be. partly because our
knowledge of the factors themselves is still very meager,
and partly because there are still other factors in the situa-
tion, economic and non-economic. If the servicesof the
military and naval forces and the output of warmaterial
are included in the measure of outputnational output per
capita might be expected (on the basis of the presentdis-
cussion) to be greater during war, on the average,than
during the preceding period of peace. Peremployed per-
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son, however, a decline wouldseem to be more probablc.
rhe chances seemstrong that per manhour (ourmeasure
of labor productivity)there will sooner or later hea drop.
though it may come only afteran initial spurt of activity.
within the limits of theformer peace SCL-uJ) ofequipment,
organization, etc.. during whichlabor productivitymay
rise.
The statistics, though they(10 not lid)) ttresolve all our
doubts, suggest thatthese expectationsarc probably sound.
At any rate, they doflot contradict them. In the United
States national productpr person employed FOSC about15
per cent from 1914 to 1916, but(luring the period ofour
participation in the war it declinedor io per cent.'" It j
very likely, nloreo%'er, that thedeclinemanhour from
1916 to i (J i8was greater than per luau.2" A similarstory
can be told for Australia andSweden, according to Cohn
Clatk's remarkaj)lecollection of statis(jcs.21
What happenedto PhYsical outputpci- manhour in the
several sectors of Americanindustry must be inferredin
some cases fromdata on outputper milan. In mnanufactur..
ing, outputper man eniploved rose sharplyfrom 191.) to
1916. then declinedas rapidly. Hours of laborpresumably
rose during 1914-16 andcould scarcely have fallen(luring
1917-18. It is probable, then,that factory outputper man- hour rose slightlybetween 1914 and iqi6,and fell from
1q16 to 11)18. In mining,there was amore certain decline in outputper manhour from1q15 to iqiS, although before
and after thewar it rose rapidly. Inagriculture, the rate of growth in outputper man seems to have slackened;but the figures for this industry,on both output and employment,
are not too meaningful fora short run analysis.!2 Insteam railroads, outputper man increased sharplyduring 1914-
17, then declined (luring'917-18.
Whether theexperience of tile first \Vorld \Varwill he repeated now can merelybe conjecturedPerhaps there is today, ascontrasted with formerwar periods, a mitigating
20circumstance in the greater easeof transition from peace
to war production.The highly developed skills of engi-
neers, plant control men,and tool makers may be less
specific' than formerly. Adaptability Lu changes in auto
models also means, to some extent at least, adaptability to
even greater changesin the product. The same may be
true, too, of theunskilled and semi-skilled worker. Very
fine division of labor implies that new work canbe learned
more readily. If a man'sjob is merely to put a nut on a
bolt, it may not matter much whether the bolt is in the
frame of a passenger car, a truck, a tank, or anairplane.
Yet at most the difference between peace and wartoday as
compared with 1914 or earlier must merely have been
lessened; it can hardly have been eliminated. Mot cover,
total war means a far greater diversion of resources than
was needed even in the warof 1914-18 and therefore neces-
sitates a greater degree of adjustment.
In this war we already hear complaints that output per
worker is falling because experienced men are growing
scarce and inexperienced workers mustbe hired. Perhaps
this lament is not yet typical. The Federal Reserveindex
of output, which, because of certain assumptionsunder-
lying its construction, can be used to measure labor pro-
ductivity only with qualification indicates (in conjunction
with employment and hours data of the Bureauof Labor
Statistics) a rise in output per manhour of about 9 per cent
between 1q38 and 1939, 5 per cent between 1939 and 1940,
andper cent between 1940 and 1941.For certain inch-
vidual manufacturing industries somewhat morereliable
data are available.23 For 26 of these I havecomputed
changes in output per manhour from 1938 to 1941.(Un-
fortunately, none is strictly a war industry, thoughthey do
include steel and non-ferrous metals.) Output permanhour
rose in 25 industries from 1938 to igg; 111 20from 1939
to 194o; and in iq from 1940 toIq4l. It seemsthat during
1941 many manufacturing industries werestill in the stage
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when output obtainedper manhour of work had not yet
stopped rising.
If ofle may judge from the Departmentof Commerce
estimates of national income, deflated by th.Bureau of
Labor Statistics cost of living index,24 andexpressed per
capita of the employed populationas defined by the Na-
tional Industrial Conference Board,product per worker
rose about 8 per cent from 1938 to1939, 5 per cent from
1939 to 1940, and some4 per cent from 1940 to 1941. The
differences should not be takentoo seriously; it is safe to
say merely that output per worker has apparentlynot yet
begun to fall,on an annual basis.25 In terms of manhour
Productivity, however, the situation is differentsince hours
of labor have risen.(Hours in factories roseI per cent
from 1939 to1940 and almost 7 per cent from1940 to
1941; though these changes in the workweek are probably
not typical for all industry.26) Outputper manhour may
already have stopped rising.An actual fall in productivity
per worker as well as per manhour isnot outside reason-
able expectation for thisyear, in view of the so-called
'priorities unemployment' periodthrough which we have
been passing, the costlymanufacture of synthetic rubber
and other substitutes, thebringing into production ofhigh
cost copper and other mines, thecontinued dilution of the
labor force, etc. Furtherlengthening of the work week also
may contribute to a decline inproductivity.27 Indeed, the
forces making for declinein labor productivityare perhaps
just now beginningto gain momentum. During1940 and
1941 we may have been in muchthe same stageas in 1914-
6. Labor productivitymay not rise at all this year, justas
it did not in 1917-18.
This war may lastmuch longer than World WarI. May
not therefore labor productivityagain rise when a certain
stability has been reachedin the war industries, that is,
when we have learnedthe new trades? I donot doubt that
this particular factorwill then tend to raise laborpro-
22ductivity. But almost all the other factors making for low
ered productivity will become intensified, sooner in
Europe than here, of course. The first burst of enthusiasm
may die out, and laborefficiency wane; also the continued
strain of a long work week, curtailment of consumption,
and exposure to danger, may begin to be felt. Under-main-
tenance of capital equipment in many consumer goods in-
dustries, in the railroads, and elsewhere also may finally
materialize in declines in labor productivity. The exhaus-
tion of stocks of scarce materials accumulated in anticipa-
tion of war, and increasing damage done by the enemy,
may help to tip the scales in the directionof lower labor
productivity. Indeed, any decline in output per manhour
during the next few years may well be small in comparison
with the declines that will eventually set in if the war
drags on to the point of exhaustion. But the statement of
this possibility, like other sunnises made here, can hardly
be accompanied by a probability value.
It is tempting to sound another note by referring to the
postwar period, dangerous though speculation maybe.
There will be, I suppose, another era of reorganization as
we swing back to the production of peacegoods, and one
also of uncertainty as we turn again to individualistic en-
terprise. During the initial adjustment productivity may
fall, as it seems to have done in 1919. After this transition,
however, we may hope that a real revival will come in pro-
ductivity together with a boom in output, such as occurred
during the 1920'S. Replacement, renovation, repair,and
new additions to industrial equipmentwill presumably
take place at a technological level above the prewar aver-
age. The new trades we shall have learned may turnout to
be of value in reconstruction. These changes, plusthe ac-
cumulation of ideas held back from fruition by the war,
may help us to gain some of the advancethat peace would
have brought us, and make up for some of the lossincurred
through the war itself.
23
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\Vhatever happens to labor l)ro(1ucti'y(luring the next
few years, it is importantto remember that it is product
that Counts: consumptiongoods that nourish us andwar
goods that will bringus victory. Changes in productivity
are important today onlyso far as they bear on the size of
the product; and theanalysis of productivity is significant
today only so faras it throws light on the factors affecting
output. Moreover, thecourse of labor productivity isnot
entirely beyondour control. When we pushup employ-
ruent and hours and cut capitalformation in order toex-
pand available output,we cannot afford to overlook the
deleterious effectson productivity. When we reduce civil-
ian consumption inorder to expandwar output, we must
at the same time tryto avoid reducing outputper manhour
by an amountgreater than is commensurate withthe price
We are willing to pay to attainour objectives, or greater
than the pricewe need py if we choose anothermeans
open to us. If we neglect theirpresent or ultimate effects
on labor productivity,some of our efforts to expandoutput may be self-negating.
INotes
I Capital S diminished notonly when the tllltnber of machines, etc.. is cut
but also when the averagedurability of existing equipment is reduced (as
when it is replaced by lessdurable goods or is simply allowed to age). and
when the average quality ofequipment is lowered (as when it is replaced
by less efficient equipment.requiring more materials. labor, or supplies for
operation). A two.year old truck represents lesscapital than a new truck;
as does a truckconsuming excessive amounts of fuel compared with an
efficient truck, yet all may carry the samemaximum loads.
2 National Bureau of Economic Research, is.
3 To avoid duplication in measuring aggregate war outputit is necessary to
consider war services that merely contribute to the product ion of other war
goods and services as unfinished and therefore not final' goods.
4 No series on national income is continuous for the period since1899. And
chaining several differently constructed estimatesfails to solve the prob-
lems, not altogether academic, that arise fromconceptual and statistical
incomparabilities.
Another serious difficulty is that of passing from current tofixed-base
prices. Even Dr. Kuznets' series for .959-38. conceptually the mostsatisfac-
tory. is not free from all qualification. Theearlier National Bureau series.
those of the National Industrial Conference Board, and the Departmentof
Commerce series(it is to these we must turn for information concerning
the war periods) suffer from crudity of deflation, especiallyserious because
they relate to periods of extreme fluctuation in prices. Even moderate per-
centage errors in the deflators may mean veryconsiderable percentage er-
rors in the series finally derived on real nationalproduct.
Still a third difficulty is lack of thoroughly reliable and comprehensive
data on employment, especially before igmg. Data on hours of labor actu-
ally worked are no better than those on employment.
5 Detailed reports based on these studies, made possible by fundsgranted
by The Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation of Pittsburgh, will bepub.
lished by the National Bureau of Economic Research. I amindebted to
Harold Barger, J. M. Gould. Hans Landsberg, an(l Sam H. Schurrfor the
statistics drawn from the reports being prepared by them
6The average annual rate implied by this percentagedoes not differ mate-
rially from the average rate computed for the 38 yearsexdusive of the war
period, .914-18 or 1917.18. The figures cited arebased on P.. F. Martin,
National Income in the United States, 1799.1938(National Industrial Con-
ference Board, 5938), and Simon Kurnets, op.cit.
Tin nianulacturing. hours per week were reducedalxut a third between
i8gg and 5937; in mining and steam railroads,about a fifth: and in the
building trades, about 30 per cent, according tovarious sources examined
in the National Bureau studies of production andproductivity. Instead of
the notoriously long hours formerly worked inretail trade, something
close to the 40 hour week has become custom2ry.owing to the growth of
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large stores and theroncomitant displacement of sell-employedentre-
preneurs by hired workers. It ts likely thatthe decline in this bra.ith has
been at least as largeas in manufacturing. Even in agriculture itseems
that hours have declined slightly.One estimate puts the decline atabout
a tenth. Average hours for the entireeconomy have also been reduced be-
cause of the decreased relative importanceof farming, with its relatively
high level of hoursper week.
8 It is possible that themeasures for the several branches of indusLry,Since they are based ongross physical output, may in some casesoverstate some- what the increase innet physical output per unit of laborexpended. (For
a discussion of the distinction betweengross and net physical output see
Solomon Fabticant, TheOutput of Manufacturing lndusjrjs,1899-1937, Ch. ;National Bureau of EconomicResearch, 1940.) II allowancewere made for increases indepredation, fuel, and other costsassociated with purchases from otitside industries(which for that reason should bede- ducted from grossoutput to obtain net output, whethermeasured in pecuniary or in 'physical'terms), the increases in the laborproductivity of agriculcuic and possibly alsoin mining would probably hesmaller; hut the reverse is more likelyfor manufacturing anti electricpower, and per- haps also for railroads.However, even an appreciablereduction in the figures for al! theseindustries would notremove the apparent IflCOflSiStency
between them and theeven cruder measure for the entireeconomy. It may be, too, that inbranches of industry for whichno indexes are now available (constructionother utilities, trade, service,real estate and finance, and government)labor productivity hasnot advanced as rapidly as in the industries for whichwe have data; indeed, sucha view seems quite plausible, thoughone cannot say more.
Mention of the serviceindustries brings to mind anotherconsideration: the shift towardgreater relative importance, interms of employment, of these industriesas the statistirs on the distributionof workers hs occupa- tiori and industry indicatequite clearly. If the serviceindustries were char- acterized by a ploduct.lahorratio lower than theaverage, we would have another factor helpingto account for theapparent inconsistenc' between the estimate for thetotal and for the severalparts. This is apparently not the case, howeverThe service industriesevenifwe evclde real estate (which hasa very high product-labor ratio),do not seem to con- tribute a significantlydillerent amount of nationalinconse per 'sorker than most other industries,Moreover, agriculture, witha product.lajmr ratio lower than another major industry,lost very considerabl.in relative importance
Of course, we may alwaysfall back on errors ofestimate as an explana- tion of these inconsistencies:errors in nseasuring nationalincome, in the price index tused fordeflation, in emplosment,iii physical output,etc., etc. For example, thecommon practice of usingthe cost of living index(Or any other single index) todeflate the entirenational income is subjectto serious qualifications,especially when price changesare great (as they are
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Sduring and following wars) and when capital formation is fluctuating
violently.
9 Monthly data might show somewhat more obvious cyclical alterations in
the rate of change its labor productivity.
10 Simon Kuanets, o. cit., p. 153.
11 Wesley C. Mitchell. History of Prices During the War: Sumniary (War
industries Board Price Bulletin i, igi), p. 46.
12 When preparations for war are prolonged, as in Germany and Russia,
the distinction between peace and war is less marked, of course. Produc-
thity is less affected because of the slower pace of preparations; but when
war comes, the inevitable disturbance takes its toll.
23 No assertion is implied that these limits have already been reached in
this country in the present war.
14 For a statement devoted especially to these difficulties see E. C. Robbins,
War-Time Labor Productivity, Harvard Business Review, Autumn so.
15 For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics notes (in various inimeo-
graphed reports dealing with World War I, prepared under the direction
of Stella Stewart) that the wool products, dried fruit, and shoe industries
lost experienced workers to war industry in 1917-18; and cotton goods
manufacturers found it difficult to get materials and make deliveries be-
cause of strained transport facilities.
tO See the interesting summary prepared by Lenore A. Epstein and Irving
H. Siegel of the Bureau of Labor Statistics: Increasing Productivity and
Technological Improvements in Defense Industries, Monthly Labor Re-
mew, Jan. 1942.
17 "Mr. Nelson showed little sympathy with manufacturers who dela} work
while they seek more efficient ways of turning out their products. 'Why not
start inefficiently and figure Out more efficient methods as you go along?'
he went on. Get the stuff moving and get it moving now!'" N. Y. Times,
Jan. 31, 1942.
18 Here the relevant measure of output per worker is, of course, net tame
added per worker, hot gross value of product per worker. Evidence that
the latter may be higher in war industries is therefore irrelevant.
19 No satisfactory measures of national income, a least according to pies.
ent-day standards, are available for 1914-18. King's figures (National In-
come and Its Purchasing Power, National Bureau of Economic Research,
1930) On aggregate payments to individuals, in constant prices, per person
employed (employment estimated by tile National Industrial Conference
Board in its Economic Record for March 20, sgo) show a rise ofper
cent. 1914-16, and a fall of 12 per cent, 19.6-18.
The original National Bureau estimates of national income in constant
prices (Income in the United Stales, igam and 1922), give two results, one
based on income by sources of production and another on incomes re-
ceived. These show identical rises per worker employed of i6 per cent for
27
SS
1914-16. and declines oF 15 and 13 per cent, respectively, for 1916-18The
declines in 1916-18 are less of course if the army. navy, andmarines (
million in igi8 and less than a quarter of a million in iqi6)are excluded
from the number employed (even if their salaries and subsistejiceare
excluded from the national income): nevertheless, theyremain (led ines
2 The slump in prtxluctivity. while appreciable, (li(lno more than Cancel
the rise in the preceding two years. Output per manhouritS 1918 and in
5914 was almost the same.
21 The Conditions of Economic Progress (Macmillan,1940). The figures he
gives for Japan for that period, which show avery sharp drop from1914
to 1915 and very sharp rises after 1915. seem too erraticto be Sigilificant
22 On the statistical side the data on outputare heterogeneous in thatsome
products are on crop-year bases (whichvary from clap to crop) otherson
calendar-year. On the economic side, tile majorshort rtin factor affecting
output is the weather.
23 These are indexes preparedat the Bureau of Labor Statisticsby 1. H.
Siegel and issued in mimeographed form.
21 Since wholesale prices have risenmore rapidly than the cost of living
since 1940. deflation by the former,or by a combination of the two,would
show practically no change in realnational product per workerbent-cen 1940 and igz.
25 The employment figures includemen in the armed forces andexclude
emergency employment (WPA. etc.). Ifemergency employment is included,
the percentage increases become, 6. and 5, respectively. If, further, the
armed forces are excluded, theyare so, 7, and 7, respectively.
26 Data collected by the Bureauof Labor Statistics (publishedcurrently in the Moutlily Labor Review) indicatethat hours in manufacturing,mining. and construction rose5-7 per cent between 1940 and 1945, butchat in trade, service, and the utilitiesthe changes were negligible.The general average rise was therefore probablyless thanper cent.
27 The moderate increasesin hours cited in thepreceding footnote should not lead one to understate theirpossible effects on labor productivitv. It is the level of hours inparticular industries thatcounts, not the level of the averages. A long work week inmilitary productionmay be balanced by a short week in consumergoods industries, and theaverage may be mode- rate. Yet the inefficiency resultingfrom a long work week inmilitary pro. duction will not hebalanced by extra efficiency inthe industries with a shorter week.
Just what the most efficientor desirable work ss'eek should bein an in. slustry depen(ls on the characterof the industry concernedas well as on many other factors, and nogeneral statement call be made.The discussion above is not intendedto imply that present levelsof hours are or are hot excessive.
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